The Anatomy of Allied Occupation:Contesting the Resumption of Japanese Antarctic Whaling, 1945-52 by Aldous, Christopher
1 
 
The Anatomy of Allied Occupation: 
Contesting the Resumption of Japanese Antarctic Whaling, 1945-52 
Christopher Aldous 
University of Winchester 
e-mail: chris.aldous@winchester.ac.uk 
Abstract 
This article scrutinizes the controversy surrounding the resumption of Japanese Antarctic 
whaling from 1946, focusing on the negotiations and concessions that underline the nature of 
the Allied Occupation as an international undertaking. Britain, Norway, Australia and New 
Zealand objected to Japanese pelagic whaling, chiefly on the grounds of its past record of 
wasteful and inefficient operations. As a result of their opposition, the Natural Resources 
Section of GHQ SCAP was forced to increase the number of Allied inspectors on board the 
two Japanese whaling factories from one to two, and to respond carefully to the criticisms 
they made of the conduct of Japanese whaling. United States sensitivity to international 
censure caused the Occupation to encourage the factory vessels to prioritize oil yields over 
meat and blubber for domestic consumption. Moreover, MacArthur summarily rejected a 
proposal to increase the number of Japanese fleets from two to three in 1947. With its 
preponderance of power the United States successfully promoted Japanese Antarctic whaling, 
but a tendency to focus only on outcomes obscures the lengthy and difficult processes that 
enabled Japanese whaling expeditions to take place on an annual basis from late 1946. 
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Much like the more recent military occupation of Iraq and the war that preceded it, the 
Occupation of Japan that followed Japan’s defeat in the Asia-Pacific War was a multinational 
operation in more than just name. While it is indisputable that the preponderance of power 
lay with the United States and the reform programmes so strongly associated with the 
Occupation period were largely defined and urged on the Japanese by Americans, it is 
nevertheless the case that General MacArthur as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers 
(SCAP), together with his subordinates in GHQ SCAP,1 understood the need to pay due 
regard to the views and sensibilities of their allies. They understood that the United States led 
a coalition of nations that had contributed to the defeat of Japan, albeit to varying degrees, 
and that the subsequent establishment of Allied bodies – the Far Eastern Commission (FEC) 
and the Allied Council for Japan (ACJ) – reflected a commitment to some degree of 
consultation on major policy decisions. Conversely, the presence of a substantial British 
Commonwealth Occupation Form (BCOF) in southern Japan likewise demonstrated a 
determination among some allies, most notably Britain, Australia and New Zealand, to make 
a material contribution to the Occupation and so acquire some leverage in the decision 
making process.  
This article begins by briefly reviewing the literature on the Allied dimension of the 
Occupation with a view to illuminating its limited or at least fragmented nature. Whilst the 
scholarship of recent decades has seen a discernible historiographical shift towards framing 
the Occupation as an international undertaking, few studies capture the complexity of the 
relationship between the United States and its allies. Historians have paid little attention to 
the various levels at which disputes played out and the tension between American confidence 
in their leadership and power on the one hand and their need to accommodate their coalition 
partners on the other. This tension is clearly evidenced by the dispute over SCAP’s decision 
to authorize the resumption of Japanese Antarctic whaling, which was vigorously opposed by 
3 
 
Britain, Norway, Australia and New Zealand. By contextualizing this controversy, explaining 
the turbulence it created between the United States and its allies, and exploring the efforts 
made by the Occupation authorities to manage that conflict, this article adopts a more 
nuanced view of the anatomy of Allied Occupation. It demonstrates that an over-emphasis on 
American power obscures some of the more significant multilateral considerations that 
caused those in GHQ SCAP to tread carefully, to work closely with like-minded Japanese to 
buttress its position in the face of criticisms from other nations. As will become clear, those 
Americans with responsibility for justifying, authorizing and supervising Japanese Antarctic 
whaling were engaged in a delicate balancing act. At the same time as they conceded some 
ground by permitting Allied observers on the Japanese whaling factories, they worked 
extremely hard to counter any criticisms, striving to represent the Japanese fleets as efficient 
and productive, particularly in the context of Japan’s food supply crisis and shattered 
economy. Motivated by the urgent need to conserve stocks of whales, all the parties involved 
stressed Japanese compliance with international whaling agreements as the most critical issue. 
Japanese Antarctic whaling thus became a focus for arguments around food and diet (whale 
meat), Japan’s economic recovery (whale oil) and its rehabilitation as a law-abiding nation 
that reveal much about the inner workings of Allied occupation. 
In a wide-ranging and perceptive essay on the historiography of the Occupation of 
Japan, written in the early 1980s, Carol Gluck referred to an emerging and overdue 
broadening of perspective on “what was officially an Allied occupation beyond the confines 
of narrowly Japanese-American relations.” Gluck cited recent studies of British or Australian 
contributions that “revealingly describe the parts played by these nations,” so suggesting that 
the conventional bilateral approach marginalised other important players.2 Roger Buckley’s 
pioneering study of Britain’s role in the Occupation illuminated a significant diplomatic 
relationship that was weighted heavily in favour of the United States but was complicated by 
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major differences – over trade and the peace treaty, for example – that were not always easy 
to resolve.3 Moreover, Britain’s representation on the ACJ was framed in terms of the British 
Commonwealth, suggesting a common purpose between Britain and Australia when in fact 
their approaches were not always convergent. Australia emerged from the war “a fresh, 
vigorous and provocative player on the international stage,”4 willing to defend its interests 
very robustly.  
It is no surprise then that Takemae Eiji – one of the leading Japanese historians of the 
Occupation – should insist on acknowledging the Allied presence in the form of the BCOF, 
numbering as many as 40,000 troops and led by an Australian general, and the Allied voice, 
expressed in the FEC and the ACJ. Still, he stresses that the Occupation was “unitary and 
preponderantly American,” and that MacArthur “held the BCOF to a very subaltern position.” 
Likewise, Takemae does not depart from the usual line on the Allied bodies – the FEC, 
established in Washington DC, was “technically a decision making body,” but “lacked 
operational control and in practice depended largely on American goodwill.” Whilst the ACJ 
sat in Tokyo and was made up of representatives of the United States, Soviet Union, China 
and the British Commonwealth, it was principally a forum for discussions about Occupation 
policy that seldom altered the preferred position of the Americans. William Macmahon Ball 
represented the British Commonwealth, a vocal Australian, who was not afraid to challenge 
Occupation policy and so was viewed by MacArthur, like his Chinese and Soviet 
counterparts, as a troublemaker. Similarly, the chair of the FEC’s steering committee, Sir 
Carl Berendsen, was a New Zealander who kicked against what he saw as the United States’ 
excess of power in Japan. Indeed, Australia and New Zealand frequently worked closely 
together to pressure the Americans into conceding some ground to them.5   
Takemae is right to highlight the international dimension of the Occupation but to 
also stress that the United States in the person of MacArthur usually got its way despite 
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Allied protests. However, this tendency to focus on outcomes ensures that the Occupation as 
predominantly an American project continues to be centre stage, obscuring some of the more 
telling episodes taking place in the wings. For example, in 2012 Franziska Seraphim praised 
Sarah Kovner’s study of prostitution in Occupied Japan “as one of the very few studies of 
occupied Japan that takes seriously the presence of the British Commonwealth Occupation 
Force with its multicultural troops” and shows that “social policies had to be negotiated 
among the Allies, even though the differences in policy were more a matter of degree than 
substance.”6 By focusing on process rather than outcomes, by exploring the reality of 
negotiation and some give and take on the part of the United States and its Allies, we can 
better understand the anatomy of Allied Occupation. In many cases, of course, the 
Occupation authorities were able to advance their reform agendas with relative ease despite 
frequent objections from the Soviet Union. Thus, studies of educational reform, public health 
initiatives or the decentralisation of policing, for example, almost exclusively analyse United 
States policy and Japanese responses. However, issues like food aid and the related matter of 
fisheries and whaling provoked much opposition from Allied powers with interests in the 
region, such that Americans in Tokyo and Washington worked long and hard to manage the 
political turbulence that ensued. In these cases general disquiet amongst the United States’ 
allies at policies that seemed overly sympathetic to Japan eclipsed emerging and more 
familiar Cold War tensions.7  Internal memoranda, reports and check sheets available at the 
National Archives in Washington DC illuminate these conflicts – they are not discernible in 
more visible records that report the official line on the Occupation, so finessing much of the 
upheaval and conflict occurring behind the scenes. 
In his account of the Far Eastern Commission, published by the Department of State 
in 1953, George Blakeslee contended that the resumption of Japanese whaling in the 
Antarctic and the extension of authorized fishing zones for Japan “aroused acerbic 
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discussions within the Commission and led probably to more hard feelings on the part of 
some of the FEC countries than any other issue.”8 Historians have explored the controversy 
from legal, diplomatic and environmental vantage points,9 but have not adequately mined it 
for the insights it provides on the nature of Allied Occupation. This article examines the 
divisions that arose between the United States and its allies over the issue and considers how 
they were managed rather than resolved. The dispute arose from a strong feeling on the part 
of nations with large whaling industries, namely Britain and Norway, that Japan was being 
permitted by the United States to catch whales in a highly productive region that they wished 
to dominate. They resisted the proliferation of whaling fleets in the face of a fixed limit on 
the killing of baleen whales (16,000 blue whale units or BWU) for the Antarctic season (8 
December – 7 March) that had been imposed to conserve stocks.10  
Britain and Norway found it particularly galling that the United States was allowing 
Japan to resume Antarctic whaling despite Japan’s refusal to sign up to international whaling 
agreements in the late 1930s, when it had earned a reputation for flouting the rules and 
potentially threatening the sustainability of the British and Norwegian whaling industries. 
Australia and New Zealand also constantly invoked Japan’s tainted reputation – both objected 
to Japanese whaling fleets in an area of strategic interest to them. Moreover, Australia had 
aspirations to develop its own pelagic whaling industry and so coveted the Japanese whaling 
factories as reparations. All those Allied nations hostile to the resumption of Japanese 
Antarctic whaling highlighted Japan’s past disregard for international whaling accords, 
alluding to an apparent laxness and wastefulness on the part of Japanese whalers. A 
compound of animosities that arose from Japanese aggression and wartime misconduct 
dwarfed its image problem around pelagic whaling. Wartime enemies chastised Japan as a 
renegade nation, guilty of committing war crimes, and this censure translated to the high seas, 
her pre-war fishing and whaling fleets similarly characterised as ruthless and lawless. Indeed, 
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William Tsutsui refers to Japan’s “worldwide reputation for aggressive, predatory fishing 
practices and a lack of respect for international norms.”11 It is difficult to measure the degree 
to which Japanese whalers flouted the rules and how much more egregious their conduct was 
compared to other nations’ whalers. Interestingly, Japan excused her refusal to sign up to the 
international whaling protocol by reminding other signatories that she was a latecomer to 
Antarctic whaling, sending its first whaling factory to the region in late 1934.12 
Japan chose to disregard restrictions that were enumerated in the Convention for 
Regulation of Whaling of 1931 (effective from January 1935) and the much more 
comprehensive Protocol of the International Agreement for Regulation of Whaling, 
negotiated in London in 1937, and later referred to as the “Principal Agreement.” The latter’s 
key provisions stated that there was now to be an inspector on each factory ship, and 
governments were to prosecute those who broke the rules (Articles 1 and 3 respectively). It 
prohibited the killing of grey whales as well as right whales (Article 4) and stipulated 
minimum lengths for particular species – whalers were to desist from killing blue whales less 
than 70 feet in length, fin whales less than 55 feet and humpback and sperm whales less than 
35 feet (Article 5). It limited the whaling season in the Antarctic to the period 8 December to 
7 or 15 March (Article 7). Otherwise the 1937 agreement reiterated provisions of the 1931 
convention in relation to the ban on killing calves and their mothers (Article 6), the optimal 
use to be made of all whales taken (Article 11), the provision of data (Articles 16 and 17) and 
the need for remuneration of crews to reflect sound principles of conservation (Article 13).  
The meaning of “conservation” at this time differed from current usage, its focus more on 
utilitarian principles – whaling should be rational and efficient, reflecting the latest scientific 
advances, and waste was to be avoided at all costs.13 Signatories of the new agreement were 
optimisic that it was “likely…to go far towards maintaining the stock of whales, upon which 
the prosperity of the whaling industry depends,”14 the latter being the key consideration. 
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Japan was not the only newcomer to Antarctic whaling – so too was Germany which 
signed the new protocol, together with South Africa, United States, Argentina, Australia, UK, 
Irish Free State, New Zealand and Norway. The signatories declared that their efforts might 
be frustrated by recourse to unregulated whaling by other countries, causing whaling to 
become unsustainable. They were particularly mindful of Japan in this regard. Its whaling 
fleet in the Antarctic during the 1937-8 season was composed of four floating factories and 
thirty catchers, and it began its operations on 1 November 1937, continuing them until 26 
March 1938 (so disregarding the stipulated dates). The ill-feeling that grew against Japan 
reflected the rapid expansion of its operations – whereas in 1935-6 it was responsible for only 
2% of the whales harvested in the Antarctic grounds, in 1938-9 it accounted for 19.7%, 
compared with 30% for Norway, 29.2% for the UK, 13.2% for Germany.15  
Japan’s refusal to sign up to the 1937 protocol gave credence to the view that it 
carelessly over-exploited whale stocks, that it “remained aloof, preferring freedom of action 
for its nationals to the restraints of international agreements, and taking a short sighted view 
of the consequences of its actions.”16 It is difficult to estimate the degree to which such 
censure was justified, particularly as it may have reflected resentment at unwelcome 
competition and concerns about Japanese depredations more generally. In March 1947 Ada 
Espenshade of the Natural Resources Section (NRS) of GHQ SCAP produced a summary of 
past Japanese whaling transgressions, listing them from the mid-1930s until 1940-41. He 
noted, for example, that Japanese fleets had illegally killed grey whales in coastal and 
colonial waters, they had routinely begun their Antarctic whaling in November rather than 
December, and that one factory in 1941 took fifty under-sized whales (three fin, 29 
humpback and 18 blue whales).17 In short, Japan’s history of disregard for the rules provided 
grounds for Allied misgivings about the American decision to permit Japanese whaling 
factories to return to the Antarctic for the 1946-7 season. Then again, they may have 
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preferred to exaggerate Japanese wrongdoing in the past so as to distract attention from any 
claims of laxness on the part of their own whaling fleets’ conduct. These considerations 
fuelled the heated exchanges that took place between the United States and its allies from 
1946 to 1950. 
To begin with the Occupation authorities were resistant to any Japanese requests to 
resume pelagic whaling beyond some limited operations around the Bonin (Ogasawara) 
Islands around 1,000 kilometres south of Tokyo. At a conference on the subject that took 
place on 29 January 1946, NRS officials cautioned two Japanese representatives of Taiyô 
Gyogyô (Ocean Fishing), one of whom was a director of the company, that the captains of 
their whaling vessels must read and understand the provisions of the international whaling 
conventions. Rather tactlessly the Japanese executives requested that several German whaling 
vessels that they understood the United States was receiving as reparations be given to the 
Japanese to operate in the Antarctic. Richard Croker of the Fisheries Division of NRS 
impatiently responded that the Norwegian and British whalers would have priority for any 
surplus vessels, that “the Antarctic is outside the authorized Japanese whaling areas,” and that 
“the US wouldn’t let them have the vessels anyway.” Still, the Japanese representatives 
persisted, “naively” stating that “as long as we had opened the Bonins they expected us to 
open any other whaling grounds they wanted.”18  
In fact, the director of Taiyô Gyogyô and his colleague were prescient in their 
demands. Little more than a month later officials in Washington DC were frantically 
responding to the spectre of famine in Japan invoked by General MacArthur’s “statement of 
stupendous food requirements.” They dispatched a high-level special Japanese food 
commission, representing the Departments of State, War, and Agriculture, to confirm the 
seriousness of the crisis.19 Colonel Raymond Harrison, who headed the commission, had no 
hesitation in recommending large-scale food relief, chiefly in the form of cereals. Moreover, 
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Washington DC provided a strong steer that Japan should resume Antarctic whaling. 
Secretary of Agriculture Clinton Anderson urged Harrison to recommend to General 
MacArthur “whaling operations through [1946-]1947 season.”  Thus, Harrison called on the 
Occupation to expand Japanese fishing and whaling activities “so that full utilization of 
potential production for Japanese feeding may be made and the excess if any exported as a 
contribution toward the solution of the world-wide food shortage and to obtain foreign credits 
for necessary imports.”20 Here was the essential rationale for what would prove to be a very 
contentious decision in the eyes of the United States’ allies – whaling would alleviate hunger 
and it would assist economic recovery. As will be seen, the weight given to each of these 
factors in the diplomatic wrangles of the next few years shifted according to circumstances, 
the urgent food shortage giving way to the need for economic recovery from 1947. 
However, Japan had very little whaling capacity in early April 1946 and so there was 
no immediate prospect of any international tension over the issue. With the sinking of its six 
Antarctic factory ships of 10,000 to 20,000 during the war, just one small factory (1,500 tons) 
was operating around the Bonin Islands.21 In a conference on 11 February with Herbert 
Schenck, the Head of the NRS, Harrison pressed for Japan to be equipped with the necessary 
factory vessels and machinery for rendering the whale oil. He also maintained that the State 
Department would be responsible for any necessary negotiations with foreign governments 
with fishing or whaling interests likely to conflict with those of Japan.22 These two processes 
– developing domestic shipping capacity and exploring the likely legal and diplomatic 
repercussions – unfolded in tandem over the next few months. As regards the latter, the State 
Department informed NRS on 16 May that it approved the policy of resumption of Japanese 
Antarctic whaling for the 1946-47 season provided that the whale oil produced would be 
subject to allocation by the International Emergency Food Council (IEFC), and that “this 
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expedition was without prejudice to future decision regarding disposition of vessels, 
equipment [as reparations] and products.”23  
At the same time NRS was liaising with the Japanese Bureau of Fisheries to establish 
how quickly the required whaling fleet could be assembled. Japanese officials assured them 
that two 10,000 ton oil tankers could be converted to factory ships and these, together with 
twelve killer boats (around 350 tons each) and seven carrier vessels, would be ready in time 
for the 1946-47 Antarctic whaling season should the United States finalise the decision for 
Japan to participate.24 Formal authorization followed on 6 August 1946 in a SCAP instruction 
(SCAPIN 1103), entitled Japanese Whaling Operations in the Antarctic. This specified 
precisely the area of operations, the vessels permitted to take part, and the requirement to 
report every 24 hours the number, kind and output of whales processed.  The last paragraph 
of the SCAPIN stated that “this authorization does not establish any precedent for whaling 
operations in the Antarctic area…for any subsequent period of time nor is it an expression of 
Allied policy relative to ultimate determination of national jurisdiction, international 
boundaries or fishing and whaling operations in the area concerned….”25  
Although this final provision was clearly intended to allay the concerns of a number 
of the United States’ allies with interests in the area, they did not hesitate to object strongly to 
what they considered to be an inexplicable and misguided policy on the part of GHQ SCAP. 
The Norwegian government was the first to express its opposition, and the Australian 
objection followed on 8 August, insisting that the Occupation authorities halt any 
preparations for the expedition to enable its government to study the problem thoroughly.26 
On 21 August the British Commonwealth representative on the Allied Council for Japan, 
William Macmahon Ball, cautioned General MacArthur that he had refrained from raising the 
subject at that morning’s meeting to avoid a public clash between the United States and those 
governments he represented, but that the latter were nevertheless “perturbed” by the 
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Occupation’s directive of 6 August. He called on the Supreme Commander to “defer” his 
final decision on the dispatch of the Japanese whaling fleet until his government and others 
had had the opportunity to express their concerns in detail.27  
In a lengthy aide memoire to the State Department, dated 3 September 1946, the 
British Embassy detailed their objections to the new policy, “expressing their profound 
concern at the manner in which these proposals have so far taken shape.” The British 
government was very “apprehensive that the Japanese whaling expedition will, in fact, 
constitute a precedent and in the light of the extremely bad whaling record of the Japanese it 
is considered that the character of the expedition should be radically changed.” The statement 
claimed that the Japanese would prioritise meat over oil and so would infringe the whaling 
regulations by killing young whales, as they had often done in the past. Despite these 
concerns, however, the British government approved the Antarctic venture subject to a 
number of conditions, the most important of which were that the expedition should be run by 
SCAP under the control of Allied personnel; that all the oil should be subject to allocation by 
the IEFC and not just the surplus remaining after Japanese requirements; that the expedition 
should not constitute a precedent nor should it prevent whaling ships being surrendered as 
reparations; that each factory ship should be allocated a quota of whales that should not be 
exceeded; that Japanese whaling practice should maximise the production of oil in line with 
modern standards; and that “qualified allied inspectors” should monitor the work of the 
Japanese crews. Finally, the British government expressed alarm that the Japanese had been 
authorised on 23 August to convert a tanker into a whale factory ship, because this presaged 
the “rehabilitation of a Japanese whaling industry without the fullest consultation with all 
interested Governments.”28  
Other countries, namely Norway, Australia, the Netherlands and New Zealand, 
detailed similar objections and safeguards. All complained about Japan’s past disregard for 
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whale conservation, namely its apparently antiquated, inefficient and wasteful operating 
methods and its failure to sign up to international agreements. Australia and New Zealand 
were also concerned about the Japanese whaling in an area of obvious strategic interest to 
them and worried about security issues, namely the ease with which a whaling fleet could be 
converted to military use in the future. Britain and Norway were particularly exercised by the 
commercial disadvantage posed by a Japanese whaling expedition depleting the number of 
whales that they could catch, given there was a fixed limit of 16,000 BWU. As the British 
aide memoire of 3 September 1946 made clear, the British wanted the various fleets to be 
allocated particular quotas to minimise this problem, assuming that Britain and Norway 
would get the lion’s share as befitted their larger fleets. Although the American authorities 
did not agree to this or to most of the other British conditions, they fully appreciated the need 
to accommodate their allies’ concerns and so conceded that the Japanese whaling expedition 
would be under international control, that there would be Allied inspectors on board the 
factory ships closely monitoring Japanese whaling practices to ensure compliance with 
conservation agreements. They strengthened this major concession the following year, when 
bad-tempered exchanges over what was characterised as a one-off venture escalated into a 
diplomatic furore over the United States’ authorisation of a second Japanese Antarctic 
expedition for the 1947-48 whaling season.  
In the meantime NRS undertook hasty preparations for the departure in November 
1946 of two Japanese whaling fleets centred on the factory vessels, the Hashidate Maru and 
the Nisshin Maru. Mindful of the need to be sensitive to the apprehensions of their allies, they 
were careful to ensure that the fleet was in good working order and the Japanese crews 
understood that they had to comply fully with international whaling regulations. NRS carried 
out associated briefings and inspections to underline the importance of the need for efficient 
whaling operations. Indeed, Hubert Schenck himself conducted a tour of inspection of the 
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Hashidate Maru, warning the Japanese crew that “the eyes of the world were upon this 
expedition.” He reminded them that “General MacArthur had granted permission for the 
whaling expedition for purely humanitarian reasons and their strict observance of whaling 
regulations was a test of their fitness to be included in the family of law-abiding nations.”29  
With this remark, Schenck neatly captured the larger purpose of the Occupation as 
understood by prominent American reformers. For them it was a period of civilizational 
probation that was necessary to rehabilitate Japan, to restore her reputation as a respectable 
member of the world community. 
As for who would monitor the Japanese whaling fleets, those in charge were not able 
to find experienced personnel from the United States and Allied nations, largely because of 
time limitations. Also, likely candidates would face the unappealing prospect of being 
confined to a whaling factory for more than four months, further depleting the pool of 
volunteers. NRS selected Lieutenant David McCracken to represent SCAP on the Hashidate 
Maru and Australia nominated Kenneth Coonan as the Allied representative. Their 
counterparts on the Nisshin Maru were A. J. Brewster of the Royal Navy (retired) and 
Captain William Terry, formerly of Technical Intelligence Company, who was transferred to 
NRS. None of them had any experience of being an inspector on a whaling ship, although 
Coonan and Brewster were seasoned seafarers. Coonan had served as a petty officer in the 
Australian navy (signals) during the war, from which he was discharged on medical grounds 
in 1945. He saw in this assignment, for which he had just two days to prepare, an opportunity 
to develop a new career. Following his experience on Japanese factory vessels during the 
Occupation, Coonan went on to work as a whaling inspector at Australian shore stations 
during the 1950s. Lieutenant McCracken, who worked in the Transportation Section of GHQ 
SCAP, heard about the assignment from his roommate, who happened to work for NRS, just 
three weeks before departure.30 In other words, fairly random considerations governed the 
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selection of both the United States representative and his Allied counterpart on the Hashidate 
Maru. There is no documentation to suggest that the selection process for those joining the 
Nisshin Maru was any more rigorous. 
At the same time that the Occupation authorities appreciated the case for Allied 
inspectors, they also understood the need to stress American leadership. They wanted to 
encourage Japan’s eagerness to resume whaling in the Antarctic and so sought to minimise 
diplomatic turbulence. As George Atcheson (chief of SCAP’s Diplomatic Section) put it on 
13 September, the matter had “now become one in Japan involving American prestige…Any 
reversal…would be interpreted by the Japanese as clear indication that our predominant role 
and authority in the Occupation no longer exists and that executive action is not firm, but is, 
rather, subject to derogation upon unjustified foreign representation.”31 The tension in this 
case between American prestige consequent on unilateral action and the need to 
accommodate other nations in what was formally an Allied Occupation is palpable. Atcheson 
understood that “foreign representation” was fully justified even if it clashed with a strong 
United States position favoured by the Japanese. His difficulty lay in reconciling the two, 
particularly when allies pushed hard to defend their interests against those of the Occupation 
as he saw them. 
These initial tensions highlighted the importance of managing effectively the first 
postwar Japanese expedition to the Antarctic. British and Australian protests about the 
whaling vessels flying the flag of the Japanese merchant marine evidenced the sensitivity 
around the voyage being formally represented as an Allied one. The Australians insisted that 
the Japanese vessels “be forbidden to wear…any symbol which might be interpreted to 
indicate that the expedition is Japanese one.”32 Following the return of one of the carrier 
vessels to Yokohama in March 1947, the UK Liaison Mission in Japan contacted the 
Diplomatic Section of GHQ SCAP, stating that they had seen a photo in a Japanese 
16 
 
newspaper of the ship flying the flag of the Japanese merchant marine rather than the 
International “E” and demanded to know why this had been permitted. Schenk responded as 
chief of NRS, explaining that the Japanese flag could not be flown in the Antarctic but could 
be raised once the fleet was within its authorized fishing area and in the vessels’ home ports. 
Such relatively minor matters paled into insignificance compared to the complementary 
issues of conservation, productivity and efficiency, particularly with regard to oil yields. 
Judging from the report of the British observer on the Nisshin Maru, dated 28 April 
1947, the Japanese crew’s practices complied with international whaling regulations, and 
such violations as the killing of undersized whales were rare and in most cases unavoidable 
due to bad weather conditions. He noted that projected targets for production of meat and oil 
were met, despite “some primitive methods employed, breakdowns and untrained 
personnel.”33 A few months later a senior figure in the British Foreign Office would express 
his surprise at Brewster’s positive report given “the antiquated facilities” on Japanese 
whaling vessels, claiming that he had obviously been “bribed by the Japanese” and an 
investigation was being conducted to that effect.34 Apparently nothing came of it, although 
Brewster did not serve as an Allied observer the following year. SCAP’s representative, 
Captain William Terry, reported “an uneventful voyage,” and stated that the Japanese had 
“obeyed provisions of SCAP directives and international regulations,” excepting the 
“accidental capture of three whales that were found to be slightly under minimum size.” He 
also noted that the factory’s efficiency could be improved by altering the hatch openings, the 
factory gear and the boilers should “permission for future operation be granted.”35 
In contrast, the voyage of the Hashidate Maru proved much more contentious and 
caused a major rift between the United States and its allies. As SCAP’s representative, David 
McCracken adopted a sympathetic and positive attitude to what he witnessed, as is clear from 
his account of his time on the factory ship, entitled Four Months on a Jap Whaler. For 
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example, when the Japanese skipper, Captain Miyata, reported to him that one of his catcher 
vessels had killed a blue whale 68 feet in length (and so two feet short of the prescribed limit), 
McCracken chided him for the mistake but told him to “haul him on the flensing deck and 
work him up, just like the rest.” Such errors were inevitable, McCracken wrote, wondering 
“how a gunner is supposed to be able to judge the length of a whale while it is in the water. 
At most, he never sees more than a few feet of his back at one time.”36  
However, the factory also experienced more intractable problems. From the start of 
the expedition, McCracken remarked that the Hashidate Maru had been “badly adapted.” Its 
design problems made for some inefficiency, but most seriously the vessel did not have 
enough boilers to render the whalebones into oil. Given that the factory would be engaged in 
preparing meat and blubber for human consumption as well as producing oil, NRS had 
wrongly assumed that three boilers would be enough. As a result, after just a few weeks of 
whaling, the decks had become cluttered with bones, and this bottleneck was holding up 
production. McCracken called a crisis meeting, identified with the crew the bones that were 
richest in oil, and finally gave written instructions “to discard some of the poor bones.” He 
recorded that the crew was “very grateful” and that “Ken [Coonan] agreed heartily that it was 
the correct move.” Whilst these measures soon cleared the decks and expedited the 
processing of whales, the decision to throw away some of the bones contravened the 
international whaling agreements that McCracken was there to enforce.37  
Despite apparently cordial relations during the voyage, Coonan was highly critical of 
the “wastage of oil-bearing material, mainly bones” in his official report on the expedition, 
dated 15 April 1947. He referred to piles of back-bones and ribs obstructing work on the 
flensing deck, making it dangerous and difficult, and noted that on several occasions they 
were left lying around for two days – so causing the oil to seep or dry out. Captain Miyata 
informed Coonan that most whale factories had at least six boilers, and his last ship had been 
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fitted with fourteen. In Coonan’s opinion, “the Japanese were taking more whales than they 
could handle in the boilers, and the logical remedy would have been to have taken less 
whales.” He reported that on some occasions when the factory was very busy, the complete 
back-bone and whole sides of ribs were discarded, and such actions were defended by 
McCracken on the basis that much time would be lost cutting them up for rendering in the 
boilers – time that could be better used catching more whales and processing their meat. 
Coonan’s most stinging rebuke came towards the end of the report when he accused SCAP of 
disregarding the vessel’s deficient equipment so as “to produce as much salted meat and 
salted blubber as possible without regard to International Whaling Agreements.” The 
Japanese crew, he maintained, were happy to prioritize the production of meat and blubber, 
because it was destined for home consumption, whereas the oil was to be transferred to the 
IEFC.38 Rather than acting on their own initiative, the Japanese understood that the primary 
justification for this whaling expedition was the urgent provision of food and so prioritised 
that over the production of oil. McCracken’s actions did little to discourage this approach. 
Kenneth Coonan’s report took on added significance when it transpired that 
MacArthur was planning to authorize a second Japanese expedition to the Antarctic for the 
1947-8 season. As has been shown, United States officials presented the first one as a 
temporary expedient, intimating that any further decisions on the matter would be made only 
after consultation with interested allies. Australia, New Zealand, the UK and Norway 
manoeuvred within the Far Eastern Commission (FEC) in late 1946 and early 1947 to 
confirm a compromise in line with their wishes and were confident that they had achieved it – 
that the United States would not authorise further whaling without their agreement.39  
Norman Makin, Australia’s ambassador to the United States and the most effective 
critic of its support for Japanese whaling, claimed that the FEC was “lulled into a sense of 
false security,” only to be “suddenly…confronted on 27th May [1947] with a statement from 
19 
 
General Hilldring [Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas] that a second expedition 
was contemplated.”40 At a meeting in his office that day, Hilldring informed representatives 
of the UK, Australia, New Zealand and Norway that he was consulting them with respect to 
the proposal; he reassured them that all the provisions of the whaling agreements would be 
“carefully adhered to” and explained his government’s support for the expedition in terms of 
the provision of “food for the Japanese occupation and foreign exchange,” thereby reducing 
the burden on American taxpayers. Mr Graves, representing the UK, maintained that when 
the limit of 16,000 BWU had been agreed it was assumed that there would be no participation 
by Japanese whalers, implying that other whaling fleets would be commercially 
disadvantaged by Japanese competition. Major Plimsoll (Australia) declared that “the US 
would lose much more in terms of friendship with the allied powers by authorizing Japanese 
whaling for 1947-8 than it would gain in dollars by permitting it.” Hoping for evidence of 
Japanese malpractice during the 1946-7 season, Mr Lykke of Norway enquired as to whether 
anyone had received a report on that first postwar whaling excursion to the Antarctic.41 
A lengthy statement by Norman Makin to the FEC on 26 June indicates that Coonan’s 
report was only distributed to members on 11 June 1947, confirming – in the ambassador’s 
words – “what I have been saying about waste and infringements of the international 
conventions [on the part of Japan].” This was in the context of their past “depredations,” 
when “the Japanese ruthlessly killed all the whales they could get, regardless of sex and age, 
regardless of whether they were with calf or not.”42 On the same day (26 June 1947) the 
Australian Mission in Tokyo released a statement to the press, which criticized the United 
States’ unilateral action and summarized the case against Japanese whaling in the Antarctic 
as follows: Coonan’s “adverse report” demonstrated Japan’s unwillingness to adopt practices 
dictated by the need to conserve whale stocks; the re-establishment of a whaling industry in 
Japan was tantamount to the recreation of a naval potential that threatened the security of 
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Australia; and Australia should receive the Japanese vessels as reparations and should 
conduct the proposed whaling expedition itself, possibly with the aid of the UK, New 
Zealand and Norway.43  
The Australian press release followed SCAP’s formal authorization of Japan’s second 
Antarctic whaling expedition on 21 June 1947.44 On 22 June GHQ SCAP released a 
statement to the press defending its actions in terms of the Japanese whalers’ output last time 
round – 21,000 metric tons of desperately needed protein foods, together with 12,000 tons of 
whale oil and 11 tons of vitamin A and D oil for the world market. The Occupation 
anticipated that the second whaling trip would be every bit as productive and would be 
conducted according to the same exacting standards imposed on the first whaling fleet.45 In 
response to the Coonan report, the United States Department of State gave assurances in early 
June 1947 that the Hashidate Maru would be modified “to permit necessary processing in 
complete conformity with conventions.”46 
The bitterness of the conflict between the United States and its allies over the 
authorisation of a second Japanese whaling expedition is startling. On 26 June 1947 George 
Atcheson described the UK’s attitude as “deplorable” and expressed contempt for the 
Australian position.47 Indeed, he declared that SCAP’s decision could not be “overridden by 
the unreasonable demands of officials of a small nation [Australia] which desires Japanese 
whaling vessels for its own venal commercial interests.” Atcheson insisted that the Antarctic 
was “not an Australian lake” and the Occupation would not countenance “appeasement of the 
Australians” when the Japanese Government and newly elected Diet had “tendered formal 
expressions of gratitude” to the United States for its support.48  
On 24 July 1947 Ambassador Makin returned to the fray, articulating Australia’s 
objections very effectively on the floor of the FEC.49 He maintained that his country’s 
wartime past entitled it “to be the best judge of what constitutes a potential threat to our 
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security,” and noted that 90% of Japan’s whale catch during the 1946-7 season was obtained 
in waters adjacent to Australian Antarctic possessions. In the light of Coonan’s criticisms, 
Makin declared it unreasonable to expect Australia to trust “that the Japanese will in future 
adhere to the international whaling agreements which they have traditionally violated so 
flagrantly.” Furthermore, he insisted, the whaling practices of the Japanese during the 
previous Antarctic season had caused the loss of 3,000 tons of whale oil, together with the 
loss of another 1,326 tons from the oil-rich blubber that was salted and sent back to Japan for 
human consumption.  
Finally, Makin dismissed the American argument that the meat and blubber were 
desperately needed to lessen the dearth of animal protein in the Japanese diet – rather it 
amounted to a “trifling amount of consumption per head.” This was a valid contention. While 
the Occupation claimed that the meat harvested by the 1946-7 expedition was the equivalent 
of 34% of the “total Japanese meat consumption from indigenous farm sources in 1946,”50 it 
neglected to reveal how little meat figured in the Japanese diet. Indeed, total daily per capita 
consumption of meat (including that of whales) in 1947 was 0.97 grams compared to 7.6 
grams of fish.51 When the UK member of the FEC highlighted these discrepancies, the United 
States, Makin contended, shifted its argument from nutrition to economic recovery, 
highlighting the Japanese need for foreign exchange from the sale of whale oil abroad.52 He 
deplored the United States’ attitude, which “indulges the Japanese economy in total disregard 
of the interests of several of the main belligerents against Japan,” and urged in vain for the 
matter of Japanese whaling be brought to a vote. Ultimately, the UK feared that that “the US 
would carry out its threat to invoke the veto if the issue came to a vote in the FEC” and 
considered “the issue not of sufficient importance to risk a fundamental US-UK schism.”53 
For these reasons, no one formally objected to the FEC chair’s request on 4 September 1947 
to remove the subject of Japanese whaling from the agenda.54  
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Just because the acrimonious debate in the FEC had abated did not mean that the issue 
was any less toxic. Critics of the policy believed that the United States had acted in bad faith 
by permitting a second Japanese Antarctic whaling expedition in the face of their strong 
opposition. American sensitivity to this is demonstrated by the swift rejection of a proposal 
by NRS to fit out a third Japanese factory ship for operation during the 1947-48 season.55 
MacArthur likewise prohibited any additional factories for the third and fourth expeditions to 
the Antarctic in 1948-49 and 1949-50, because he wanted Japanese whaling to continue “on 
the same basis” to avoid the need for further authorization.56 The Supreme Commander 
understood that reopening the subject would reignite the diplomatic furore.  
More importantly, on 1 July 1947 the head of NRS stated that the number of Allied 
representatives on the whaling factories would be doubled to four,57 clearly a response to the 
angry exchanges of June. By boosting Allied involvement, the Occupation hoped to 
demonstrate that it was treating their objections seriously and to provide an opportunity for 
them to witness responsible whaling on the part of the Japanese. The NRS undertook a more 
rigorous selection process than the previous year. Rather than inviting McCracken to 
supervise operations again, they selected a more senior American officer, Lieutenant Colonel 
Waldon C. Winston, as the SCAP representative on the Hashidate Maru. His Allied 
counterparts were the Australian Ken Coonan and Commander Herman Sundt, an 
experienced Norwegian whaling inspector. William Terry of NRS once again went to sea on 
the Nisshin Maru, and was joined by Captain A. V. Hemming of the British Royal Navy 
(retired) and Lieutenant Francois Bourgois, a French naval officer.  
Despite the urgent need for the Japanese fleets to give a good account of themselves, 
to avoid any infractions that would provoke the ire of their critics, the Hashidate Maru got 
off to a very bad start. Just a fortnight after it had begun whaling, the head of NRS warned 
senior managers of Nihon Suisan (Japan Marine Products) that the record of its whaling 
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factory was “very poor,” so poor in fact that unless it was improved he would “order your 
fleet back to Japan” and would “terminate all whaling activities of your company.” Schenk 
noted that it was already responsible for three illegal catches and that its oil yield was 84.5 
barrels per BWU compared to 112.6 for the Nisshin Maru. His closing statement captured the 
sensitivity of NRS to Allied criticism – he remarked that “we have so much difficulty 
internationally with the Antarctic whaling that we have to be very careful of everything we 
do.”58 The main difficulty was over the issue of whale oil, and the charge in Coonan’s report 
of 15 April 1947 that the Japanese had wasted it. NRS had countered that the oil yield had 
been reduced by the use of blubber for food and when that was taken into account it 
compared favourably with that of other nations.59 Nevertheless, Waldon Winston had 
instructed representatives of the whaling companies before the expedition set off that “every 
effort should be made to maximize production of whale oil,” again showing how the 
justification for Japanese whaling was tilting away from the dietary deficit of protein towards 
the production of oil for foreign exchange.60 Winston had been confident that the remodelling 
of the Hashidate Maru would improve its efficiency and productivity and that the voyage 
would be a successful one.61 
Failure however continued to plague this troublesome ship. On 23 January 1948 
company officials had to explain the fifth illegal killing (67 feet in length). Claude M. Adams 
of NRS reminded them that small size whales would decrease average oil yield per BWU, 
which would cause yet more “unfavourable criticism from foreign countries.” He called for 
new size limits – 72 feet for a blue whale, 60 feet for a fin whale – and was promised the 
introduction of fines or other punishments for gunners who breached these limits.62 SCAP’s 
man on the Hashidate Maru, Winston, opposed the new length limits, calling for the 
company rather than the gunner to be penalized for the killing of undersized whales. He was 
sceptical about the figures produced by the International Bureau of Whaling Statistics, noting 
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that “conveniently many come in at maximum length” and that Norwegian whalers most 
likely had “relatives or friends at the tape.” Indicative perhaps of the beleaguered attitude of 
the United States in relation to Japanese whaling, he maintained that the British and 
Norwegians had “engaged in indiscriminate killing for decades” and they shared the same 
faults as the Japanese.63  
These comments reflected the tensions between the SCAP representative and his 
Australian and Norwegian companions on the Hashidate Maru, a kind of microcosm of the 
Allied Occupation itself. As in the larger context, Winston was definitely in charge but that 
did not mean that he could summarily dismiss his colleagues’ requests and concerns. They 
were engaged in a common enterprise and it was important that relations remained cordial so 
that they could work together effectively, particularly as they were confined to a “floating 
island for six months.” In a lengthy letter to NRS, Winston vented some of his frustrations, 
referring one or two matters to his superiors that he could normally handle in order “to avoid 
unpleasantness.” Afterall, he “had to live with these people for a few more months.” He was 
scathing about Coonan, who was “rarely out on the deck” and yet claimed expertise on the 
basis of this being his second assignment on the Hashidate Maru. Relations temporarily 
broke down when Winston did not allow him to communicate directly with his wife when the 
fleet was off the coast of Australia, insisting that he go through Tokyo. Coonan reacted 
angrily to what he saw as censorship and the Norwegian, Sundt, was sympathetic to his case. 
Further tensions arose when the Allied representatives proved reluctant to permit Winston to 
see their catch log books. When Winston told Coonan that a certain production report he 
wanted had been delayed, the latter had sarcastically asked why – “wasn’t the production 
high enough to suit you?” Likewise, Winston was rebuffed when he asked to examine 
Sundt’s logbook, the Norwegian exclaiming that “we didn’t come here to tell people how to 
do things but to observe how they do the job!” Despite this incident, Winston liked Sundt, 
25 
 
describing him as “a fine gentleman,” who could be relied on for accurate reporting.64 
However, when Sundt had tried to send messages to Oslo, detailing interim catch or 
production figures, NRS advised Winston to explain to him that weekly reports were the 
responsibility of SCAP, and that he was an “Allied observer” rather than a Norwegian 
whaling inspector.65 The language speaks volumes about the perceived relationship between 
the United States and its allies – the former made policy and the latter monitored its 
implementation. 
Nevertheless, NRS counselled that every effort be made to listen to the views of the 
observers and to limit any fallout arising from their concerns. The Supreme Commander 
himself met Coonan and Sundt on their return to Japan, thanking them “heartily” for their 
endeavours on behalf of the Occupation. He asked Sundt about violations of whaling 
regulations and the proficiency of the factory’s crew, to which the Norwegian responded by 
noting a few infractions and describing the Japanese as industrious and willing but less 
comfortable with the use of machinery than his countrymen. In response to questions, 
Coonan confirmed it was his second trip on the Hashidate Maru, it was 100% better this time, 
but that the crew caught fewer whales due to mechanical problems with a number of killer 
boats. Schenck then took the two observers out for lunch, during which Sundt complained 
about Winston’s officious attitude towards his requests – for example, Winston did not allow 
him to speak to some compatriots on a nearby whaling ship. Schenck hinted that he would 
have been more permissive.66  
The head of NRS also met with Captain A. V. Hemming, the UK observer aboard the 
Nisshin Maru, on 13 April 1948 following his return from the Antarctic. Hemming stated that 
“the Japanese did a good job” and “there was no question of [them] evading regulations” 
when there were three Allied observers and three Japanese inspectors on board. He described 
the Nisshin Maru as “a happy ship,” well run with a clear division of labour. Hemming 
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remarked that during the 1930s the Japanese factories in the Antarctic had prioritised oil, but 
now they were more concerned about alleviating hunger, they didn’t waste anything and even 
intestines were salted down and used for food. Interestingly, he claimed that only one 
undersized whale was killed and it was so close to the prescribed length that he thought Terry 
overly strict in calling it a short one. In fact, the Nisshin Maru took six illegal whales, but the 
Japanese whaling inspector did not notify NRS of these violations at the times they occurred, 
deciding to report them only at the end of the season.67 Still, the efficiency of the factory 
made these infringements less visible in the statistics. The Nisshin Maru caught 833 whales 
whereas the figure for the Hashidate Maru was only 488, causing the percentage of illegal 
whales to be 0.72 and 1.024 respectively. So the pattern of the 1946-47 season repeated itself 
– one of the whaling fleets performed well, the other much less so, both contributing to a total 
catch of 1,321 whales (1,017 BWU), missing the goal of 1,700 whales by some distance. 
They produced 36,919 metric tons of whale meat and blubber and 17,829 metric tons of 
whale oil, exceeding the target figure of 33,128 for food and falling short of the one for oil 
(20,150).68  
These numbers show that the issue was more one of productivity than the actual 
number of illegal whales killed – obviously the percentage of these would fall as the number 
of legal whales caught and processed increased. Nihon Suisan explained the unsatisfactory 
results of the Hashidate Maru with reference to two key factors – three new catcher boats 
kept breaking down and this disrupted the operations of the fleet, as did Schenck’s threat to 
recall it when a few undersized whales were killed early in the voyage. This made the 
Japanese gunners overly cautious.69 Ironically then NRS’s anxiety about any infringements of 
the whaling regulations in the face of Allied protests may have contributed to the poor 
productivity of the Hashidate Maru.  
27 
 
Given that NRS officials had closely monitored Japanese operations during the 1947-
48 season, it is not surprising that none of the observers’ reports were contentious. There is 
no doubt that the Occupation authorities were careful to treat the Allied observers with 
respect, to listen to their comments, and to accommodate their concerns. Schenk’s threat to 
recall the Hashidate Maru may have been directed as much at the Allied observers as it was 
at the Japanese owners and crew, underlining the seriousness with which NRS viewed any 
breaches of the whaling regulations. Indeed, NRS consulted no less an expert on whaling than 
Dr Remington Kellogg, Curator of the Division of Mammals at the Smithsonian Museum, to 
put the Japanese figures in comparative context. Kellogg noted that the number of undersized 
whales taken by Norwegian expeditions was less than 1% and was only 0.57% for fin whales 
killed in 1938-40.70 Thus, the figure for the Nisshin Maru compared favourably with a 
leading European whaling nation whereas the record of the Hashidate Maru perhaps did not.  
When it came to the third Japanese whaling expedition to the Antarctic for the 1948-
49 season, each factory hosted just one Allied observer (as was the case for 1946-47). This 
evidenced that the Occupation had managed to contain the diplomatic fallout of 1947, to take 
the sting out of the crisis. The same countries continued their protests but they lacked the 
force and conviction of previous years. NRS employed the French observer on the Nisshin 
Maru for the 1947-48 season, Francois Bourgois, as its SCAP representative on the 
Hashidate Maru. Promoted to the rank of Lieutenant Commander, Bourgeois was 
accompanied by the retired British naval officer, Captain Hemming. This time Ken Coonan 
supervised operations on the Nisshin Maru under Major James A. Crombie, representing 
SCAP. Again the fleet of the Hashidate Maru proved to be inefficient, due to “structural 
deficiencies which threatened loss of life and cargo, interfered seriously with operations…, 
and caused the loss of approximately 200 tons of fuel oil.” The reports of Bourgois and 
Hemming highlighted these problems. They recommended on their return to Japan that three 
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of the vessels undergo extensive repairs.71 The only other issue on the Hashidate Maru was a 
series of messages about the 1948 whaling regulations exchanged by Hemming and the UK 
government in the early weeks of the voyage that SCAP characterised as “a misunderstanding 
of the location of authority” in the Antarctic whaling fleet. Hemming had told the chief of 
NRS before he left Japan that he should “possess executive authority” and be senior to 
Bourgois. At the time Schenck had explained that he was an observer, “a guest of SCAP,” 
and formal control of the vessel lay with Bourgois. NRS dispatched a message to Bourgois on 
10 December 1948, advising him to “take no action” as the matter could be “dynamite,” but 
to keep NRS informed of developments. This again underlines the sensitivity with which the 
Occupation handled any disputes with Allied observers. 
By contrast, the Nisshin Maru was a victim of its own success. Some rather frantic 
exchanges between NRS and Crombie in early February 1949 arose from the volume of its 
whale catch and the need to process the whales in a timely fashion (the maximum time 
allowed was 33 hours). On 28 January 1949 the catcher vessels took 19 blue and 4 fin whales, 
which in the view of William Terry seriously exceeded what he regarded as the factory’s 
maximum daily processing capacity of 14 blue whales. He informed Crombie that it was 
“unwise and contrary to best conservation principles” and that he should consider not only 
the letter of international whaling regulations but also “the impressions which might be 
created in the minds of Captain Hemming and Mr. Coonan.” An official radio made the point 
very strongly – “we try to teach conservation and efficiency but to condone [this catch] 
reverses our stand.” Crombie replied that he would reduce the catch but resented what he 
thought were “ill founded accusations.”72 Ken Coonan sprang to his defence, remarking that 
the Nisshin Maru was much more efficient than the Hashidate Maru and that Crombie was 
doing an excellent job of managing the factory. Indeed, Coonan was happy to report that 
there was no “over fishing,” nor was there any evidence of “waste or violations of the 
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whaling regulations.”73 On its return to Japan, Mr Adams of NRS declared that the fleet of 
the Nisshin Maru had exceeded its targets for meat and oil. He commended the crew for its 
production of 107.4 barrels of oil per BWU, stating that if the meat and blubber had been 
reduced to oil – as was done by other whaling nations – then the figure would be an 
impressive 122.5 barrels.74 The Hashidate Maru was not far behind with a yield of 106 
barrels/BWU.75 Neither SCAP nor Allied representatives mentioned any illegal catches, 
although Tokyo District Prosectutor’s Office charged Japanese gunners with killing three 
lactating whales, only to see the case dismissed due to insufficient evidence.76 
Further Japanese whaling expeditions to the Antarctic took place in 1949-50 and 
1950-51, but were no longer accompanied by Allied observers. NRS hailed both a great 
success on the grounds that very few illegal whales were taken and oil yields were constantly 
improving. On 8 March 1950, for example, Schenck declared that during a season 20% 
shorter than the previous year the Japanese fleets had processed 20% more blue whale units, 
producing 32% more oil and 2% more meat products. Acknowledging one of the main 
sources of Allied complaint, he noted that “Throughout the season quantities of meat, which 
were salted during the first three expeditions, were processed for oil.”77 Although Norway 
and other interested nations continued formally to object to Japanese participation,78 the UK 
Liaison Mission in Japan had informed NRS on 29 August 1949 that the British government 
was satisfied that the Japanese abided by international whaling agreements, and accordingly 
did not feel “that the public interest would be served by sending a British observer with the 
Japanese expedition leaving this autumn.”79 This signalled the end of Allied representation on 
the whaling factories. The United States had contained the dispute satisfactorily although 
MacArthur did not dare to increase the number of Japanese fleets to three as NRS again 
recommended on 31 March 1949.80  In June 1951 the Occupation announced that the 
Hashidate Maru and the Nisshin Naru, both suffering from “latent structural deficiencies,”81 
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had been decommissioned as whaling factories and were to be converted back to oil tankers. 
Japanese companies were building new, much larger whaling factories of around 17,000 tons 
– the Tonan Maru and the Nisshin Maru II – that would operate from the start of the 1951-52 
Antarctic season.82 On 7 September 1951, the day before the Peace Treaty was signed in San 
Francisco, the Japanese Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry expressed its deepest gratitude 
to GHQ SCAP for approval of the dispatch of three whaling fleets to the Antarctic, two for 
baleen whaling and one for the harvesting of sperm whales.83 The Norwegian Diplomatic 
Mission insisted on the condition that the third fleet limit its catch to sperm whales.84 Finally, 
GHQ SCAP successfully secured the support of the fourteen member nations of the 
International Whaling Commission for Japan’s adherence to the International Convention for 
the Regulation of Whaling in early 1951.85 This was the culmination of the United States’ 
effort to make Japanese pelagic whaling respectable, to free it of the tarnished image that had 
bedevilled it since the1930s. 
Ultimately then the United States successfully promoted Japanese Antarctic whaling 
despite prolonged and vigorous Allied opposition, particularly from Britain, Norway and 
Australia. Judged by the final outcome of its endeavours, the outlines of the conventional 
narrative of American executive dominance triumphing over Allied complaints seem intact. 
However, careful analysis of the process of negotiation between the United States and its 
allies clearly demonstrates that GHQ SCAP had to concede ground to its critics. The United 
States felt compelled to permit Allied observers to monitor Japanese whaling practices and 
undertook the difficult task of managing individuals who, reflecting the misgivings of their 
governments, approached their duties in a sceptical frame of mind. The United States’ 
decision to represent the first expedition of 1946-47 as a one-off and then to authorise a 
second one led to a diplomatic furore in the Far Eastern Commission. The State Department 
was embarrassed by charges of bad faith, causing the Occupation to double the number of 
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Allied observers on the whaling factories and the Supreme Commander to reject the case for 
any expansion of Japanese pelagic whaling capability beyond two fleets.  
The correspondence between the SCAP representatives and their superiors in Tokyo 
shows clearly that relations on the factories were carefully managed – in relation to the 
Hashidate Maru in particular, the NRS invested much time and effort accommodating the 
views of the Allied observers and their superiors in London, Oslo and Canberra. Rather than 
dismissing their complaints, its officials made every effort to listen to them and respond to 
them in a considerate and sensitive manner. Thus, the Supreme Commander himself deigned 
to meet Coonan and Sundt following their return from the Antarctic in April 1948. When 
Hemming tried to pull rank on Bourgois the following season, NRS counselled caution in 
handling the situation, describing it as “dynamite.” The Antarctic whaling expeditions of 
1946-47, 1947-48 and 1948-49 were collaborative efforts and the careful way they were 
managed was replicated in the committees of the FEC, where the United States had to make 
its case for Japanese whaling as convincingly as possible. When critics exposed the United 
States’ arguments about remedying the dearth of animal protein in the Japanese diet as less 
than persuasive, its defence shifted to the processing of oil for earning Japan some foreign 
exchange. NRS’s increasing efforts to improve the factories’ oil yields, to prioritise those 
over meat and blubber, from the 1947-48 season onwards demonstrate this change of 
emphasis. 
What then does this controversy reveal about the anatomy of Allied Occupation? It 
shows us that the inner workings of the Occupation were more complex than has been 
understood. The United States had to account for its actions to its allies where its policies 
conflicted with their interests, and so its arguments around the resumption of Japanese 
Antarctic whaling had to be carefully calibrated and adjusted if they lost force. Also, it 
demonstrates that there were occasions when this was truly a collaborative enterprise, that the 
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United States had to work closely with its allies to achieve policy objectives – in this case the 
rebuilding of factory capacity and the rehabilitation of Japan’s whaling industry and 
reputation. General MacArthur was impatient with any constraints on his action, particularly 
with regard to the FEC and ACJ, but he and his superiors understood that Allied complaints 
in these bodies “had to be countered or pre-empted.”86 They could not ignore them. This case 
study represents the Allied Occupation of Japan as a coalition of the willing, a combination of 
American leadership and dependence on its coalition partners. When it came to whaling, 
tensions between the United States and its allies eclipsed the rising friction with the Soviet 
Union, illuminating an Occupation that when properly dissected reveals its international 
colouring and composition.   
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